这个案子把之前很多新闻都串了起来，例如：

• 中国流亡者郭文贵与北京开战
• 马来西亚指责中国窝藏1MDB逃犯刘特佐
• 美国调查刘特佐是否洗钱并向美律师团队付款
• 北京政泉控股强迫交易案一审被罚600亿元
• 中国宣布调查公安部副部长孙力军

华尔街日报中文网你能不能告诉我为何这篇中文译文和它的英文原文好像完全不是同一则新闻呢。

班农周四在康涅狄格州附近一艘属于郭文贵的游艇上被捕，郭文贵说，是他让班农留在那里躲避疫情的。

郭文贵在一次网络直播中说，班农想知道他周四为什么这么高兴，他的回答是“看到你被捕我很开心”。郭文贵说，坐牢会增强班农与中共斗争的决心。

Source: 特朗普前高级顾问班农于周四被捕，被控涉嫌挪用修建边境墙的众筹资金 – 华尔街日报

之前分享过英文版，中文翻译版终于发出来了。
感觉全篇是在给中央和中国CDC开脱，说都是地方隐瞒不报。

武汉当时刚刚花了数十亿美元举办了世界军人运动会以提高城市知名度，有来自110个国家的运动员参加了比赛。当地领导人正在努力将武汉提升为与北京和上海等大城市相媲美的大都市，这样的政绩可以帮助武汉市委书记在中央政治局中争得一席之地，政治局目前由中国25名高层领导人组成。

一位武汉市的官员说，主席习近平出席了运动会开幕式，对武汉为举办这次活动所做的努力表示赞赏，这使得地方官员以为政治局的决定可能会在数周内达成。这名官员说，整体想法就是大事化小小事化了，没人预料到疫情爆发的规模。

武汉当时还在为一年一度的政策制定会议做准备，会有数百名当地官员和政协官员参加，又时逢中国农历新年假期将近，届时会有成千上万的人在国内或去海外旅行。

地方当局迅速采取行动压制了在线讨论，删除了李文亮的消息。知情人士说，李文亮和艾芬医生都受到医院领导的正式批评。

地方官员当时试图权衡问题的程度究竟有多大。

Source: 中国疾控中心为遏制流行病而设，却在新冠暴发的关键时刻受绊 – 华尔街日报

WSJ你说说看，为什么那么多人要给他打钱呢？

纽约州一家法院在6月28日驳回了郭文贵对《华尔街日报》出版方道琼斯公司(Dow Jones & Co.)的诉讼。郭文贵起诉的事由是《华尔街日报》对Strategic Vision与上述郭文贵相关实体之间诉讼的报道。郭文贵已表示计划上诉。

最近的筹资活动也在海外引发关注。在台湾，当地新闻媒体报道称，警方阻止郭文贵的一名支持者向战友之家转账4.3万美元，原因是怀疑存在金融欺诈。新西兰一家当地新闻媒体报道称，该国数十名抗议者谴责澳新银行(Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd., ANZ.AU)阻止向GTV Media转账200万美元的决定。澳新银行对此不予置评。

郭文贵曾在网上抱怨银行阻止转账的事情，称银行方面受到了中共的影响。

Source: 与班农和郭文贵有关的一家媒体公司融资交易遭到调查 – 华尔街日报

这篇文章提到了几个之前不明确的事情：

1. 地方的CDC并不是向国家CDC汇报，而是当地卫健委；
2. 武汉期待市委书记进政治局，所以希望大事化小；
3. 国家CDC的高福是看到网上传言的红头文件才知道武汉有肺炎，于是打电话给武汉CDC同僚确认；
4. 国家CDC派去武汉的工作组到华南海鲜市场取样的时候武汉卫健委早已派人消杀了一遍；
5. 高福拿不到武汉的数据，跟美国的同僚打电话的时候气到快哭了；
6. 卫健委在1月3日发文要求各实验室上交或销毁样本，并且禁止在期刊或媒体发文章；
7. 复旦大学的张永振团队在1月3日收到病毒样本，5日取得测序结果，他向卫健委提醒这个病毒可能人传人，并在11日通过悉尼的同僚发表论文和序列。

感觉这篇文章就是在论证党管一切的外行指导内行行不通。

Wuhan had just spent billions of dollars hosting the Military World Games, involving athletes from 110 countries, in a bid to raise its profile. Local leaders were campaigning for Wuhan to be elevated to the same status as megacities such as Beijing and Shanghai, which would grant its party chief a seat on the Politburo, currently comprising China’s top 25 leaders.

President Xi attended the opening ceremony, praised Wuhan’s effort to host the event and led local authorities to believe the decision could come within weeks, according to one city official. “The whole mind-set was to reduce a big problem into a small one, and a small one into nothing,” the official said. “Nobody had anticipated the scale of the outbreak.”

（略）

By the time Dr. Li’s team reached the market early on Jan. 1, the cleanup, as recommended by the Dec. 30 report from local agencies in Wuhan, was in full swing.

The Wuhan office had sent a team to the market in the early hours of Dec. 31 to take samples and remove some animals, and dispatched a local company, Jiangwei Disinfection, to sterilize the area.

（略）

The China CDC team knew from its training it was essential to communicate quickly and clearly with the public so that people could take precautions and to prevent misinformation.

The NHC took a different view.

On Jan. 3, it issued an internal notice ordering laboratories that had tested samples to destroy them or hand them to the government and forbade anyone from publishing research on the virus directly or via the media, according to a copy seen by the Journal.

Dr. Gao, who was in Beijing trying to coordinate between local and national officials, was so exasperated that in a call with his U.S. counterpart, he came close to tears, according to people briefed on the conversation.

The NHC’s efforts to control the flow of information weren’t entirely successful.

Around midday on Jan. 3, a team of researchers at the Shanghai Public Health Clinic Center of Fudan University received a sample from a Wuhan hospital and started to sequence the genome without knowing anything about the patient or a potential link to the outbreak, according to people familiar with the matter.

In the early hours of Jan. 5, they said, a researcher who was working late saw the results: It said “very similar to SARS-type coronavirus.”

The team—led by Zhang Yongzhen, who also works at the China CDC—noticed something else: a gene for a “spike protein” on the pathogen’s surface that closely resembled the one used by the SARS-causing virus to bind to human cells. That indicated human-to-human transmission was very likely.

They sent an internal notice about their findings to the NHC that day, warning that the virus could likely spread via the respiratory tract and advising appropriate measures in public places.

No such measures were adopted for another two weeks. Nor were the results released publicly for several days.

On Jan. 9, a day after the Journal reported that China was dealing with a new coronavirus, a Chinese official publicly confirmed that for the first time. Still, it didn’t publish the genome—information that is essential for designing test kits.

Two days later, the Shanghai team’s work was published online not through official Chinese channels, but by a University of Sydney virologist, Edward Holmes, with whom Dr. Zhang had often worked. Dr. Zhang declined to comment.

Dr. Holmes said he was aware of the NHC’s Jan. 3 notice prohibiting public release at the time. “We decided to go ahead because this was an issue of such global public health importance that it just had to be done,” he said.

The following day, the NHC officially shared the genome with the world.

 

Source: China’s CDC, Built to Stop Pandemics Like Covid, Stumbled When It Mattered Most – WSJ

好像集团的党组织最近在学习这个2017年发的文件。
这是为什么呢？

　人民出版社出版的《党员必须牢记的100条党规党纪——解读》给出了参考。

这100条禁令，每一位党员都应该牢记在心！

政治纪律

1.严禁公开发表反党言论

2.严禁妄议中央大政方针

3.严禁公开丑化党和国家形象

4.严禁制作、贩卖和传播反党读物和视听资料

Source: 这些“红线”不可碰！务必牢记中共党员100条禁令-新华网

你说的这个二宝到底是不是你自己。

二宝什么也不做，跑来跑去，跑到哪儿玩到哪儿。虽然个人发展不起来，到现在朵拉住上大房子他还在住帐篷，但也能沾到朵拉辛苦建设的光。基础建设有正外部性，挡不住它会溢出到二宝身上。只要出得帐篷，各种福利一样享受，连级别也跟朵拉一样。毕竟他们俩都在一个岛上，级别跟岛走。

搭便车，就是这么爽。

终于有一天，二宝偷偷采了朵拉植下的摇钱树。朵拉积怒已久，顺势爆发。

太不公平！我要毁掉你！朵拉喊。

等等，朵拉，毁掉是什么意思？爸爸告诉你，我们家绝不允许打人。

细问之下，朵拉讲了计划。原来，游戏事游戏了，她的毁灭计划是在二宝的帐篷外设置一层层栅栏，把二宝封锁在内，让他出不了门。出不了门，自然就享受不了朵拉的建设成果。

Source: 【编辑絮语·王烁】艰难的决定_财新周刊频道_财新网